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THE END OF EUROPE'S ILLUSIONS 
t only makes sense to talk about a future, either when a final 
view of perfection has been promised to the subject of his-
tory or when the subject of history promises himself that 
same perfection. However, what is nowadays considered a 
promise within the Western society? 
Our democratic ideal, based upon a free-ranged accepted con-
tract and which allowed the dream of a society led by values, 
such as good, proper and true, did indeed start in the techni-
cal era, as it gave in to boredom, in a sanitary and selfish everyday 
political absenteeism and indifference. Currently agonizing, due to 
the institutions impotence and decadence, as well the crumbling 
of the social State and loss of belief in the political area, this is now 
corrupted by the speculative and agiota nature of the economical 
financial capitalism, to which it was undertaken. 
Simultaneously; on the one hand, European institutions 
fade; on the other hand, our everyday experience is set down by 
the media constant hustle, a loud record, which denies that same 
risk-taki,ng quotidian. So, we are carried away by smooth trips and 
unthreatening adventures into a kingdom of elusion with strik-
ing and unbelievable features that delight us with feelings and 
masquerade the human adventure into an euphoria cracked by 
the handle (Martins, 2002:i82). 
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As the Berlin wall fell, Europe seemed to come close to an end: ei-
ther the demographic depression corroded it, or the breakthrough 
of the Soviet Union marginalized it. Regarding strategic terms, Eu-
rope was out of the race. However, after ten years, the demographic 
decline was briefly overcome by the large worldng force coming 
from East Europe. Moreover, Russia was being rebalanced, which 
would be enough to even the world. 
This particular point of view mirrored things to be quite 
perfect in Europe. The Euro was a success as a single currency. 
The consolidation of an open, co-operant and sympathetic Un-
ion comes from the decision to widen it to Central, Oriental and 
Mediterranean Europe. 
Meanwhile, "Convention on the Future of Europe" (2001) 
was being launched in order to rethink its institutional develop-
ment. So, it was the end of the symbolic and low profile "European 
Coal and Steel community" (i951) those fifty years ago had an 
important part on the unique political adventure, called "Euro-
pean construction.,. 
As this last idea was being shaped, the whole Europe also fol-
lowed a pragmatic and civilized order, which dreamt with success 
and fantasized of a closed condo to do with as well pleased - our 
democratic ideal succumbed to security imagery. Afterwards, Eu-
rope would be part of"Zero tolerance" and "Zero risk" campaigns 
against a real menace: drugs, alcohol, banditry (both urban and 
suburban), terrorism, toxic waste and pollution. 
However, the political power, after the broadening to twenty-
seven member states, has been unease for overa decade now (ioo7 ). 
In the meantime, with the perspective of a new widening, which 
included the countries in the Western Balkans, as well as the rest of 
the Central European countries and the East European countries, 
nobody felt safe anymore. The European Council meetings were 
now side by side with a growing popular and violent demonstra-
Hon. Even the debate regarding" intergovernmental conferences" to 
restructure Europe had become pointless. A sort of trend was being 
created all over Europe against "Brussels bureaucrats". Nowadays, as 
regards the economical and financial European crisis underlined 
in all the South European countries, the Euro is more of a reaching 
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point than a starting point. Therefore, a unique currency seems 
to have failed concerning the building of the market, primarily 
destined by "Rome treaty" to be open and aimed at economical 
agents. Furthermore, it was barely shaped as the political union, 
an initial dream, meant for the Nation State and the citizens. 
In order to confirm that Europe was indeed politically not 
viable, Blair, Aznar, Berlusconi, Rasmussen and Barroso were, in 
2005, in charge of getting rid of all doubts, as security imagery has 
launched it, along with the United States, to a democracy in the "de-
sert campaign". A United Kingdom, that never believed in the Euro, 
accompanied by a hesitant Denmark, and the wounded countries of 
South Europe, Italy, Spain and Portugal, all of which always dragged 
their feet or ignored what was said by Germany or France, finally 
joining the United States in an unmoral way. 
For several months, Washington had predicted the future 
by rolling the dice, by observing birds fly and the chickens' guts 
(bowels). Based on what was said by its fortune tellers - politics, 
survey sellers or professional media -America learned that Osama 
Bin Laden was oppressor ofBagdad. What is more, the "Empire of 
Evil", filled with sulfur, crying and ranger of teeth had settled in 
the new surroundings of desert caves in the Mid- East.At that mo-
ment, a howling crossed Europe. Birds flying and chickens' bowels 
were now repeating what was had been predicted by a persuasive 
America: the 11th September monster had been produced inside 
the Saddam Hussein's wicked guts. 
Europe has fallen into the hands of Realpolitik. Over-
whelmed by internal competitions, submitted to political pres-
sures, betrayed by the temptation of recognition and enjoying 
the delight of riding the winners' car, Europe was crushed by 
an armed army, going from our democratic ideal to simply lac-
ing heavy boots and breading the air full oflead coming from 
"pax Americana". Subsequently, we were left behind by those we 
had elected to assure freedom, justice and peace, and then we just 
ŴŸWȘUŤTĚour institutions fall out of meaning. Their occupation 
was maintained only for purposes of reorganizing the Mid-East 
map, designed to assure the United States military domain and its 
own petrol interests. The goal of the so called ''Atlantic solidarity" 
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became a pretty weird and twisted way of giving more importance 
to the Democratic spirit. We having followed the hectic and rongh 
United States strategy, which soon turned into planetary activists, 
made our existence collapse - a spirit of concord or a united Europe 
and peace in the World. 
This story is about "The empire of Good", which rose in 
2005, befuddling the air, ragging all around, from chicken paws 
and Europe's pieces. Meanwhile, in 2008, a greedy and financial 
tsunami, usury and speculation, swiped Wall Street. From that mo-
ment on, in successive after-shocks, that same tsunami went under 
South European countries, Pirros' retribution to both Germany 
and France, as with the economical, financial and social killing of 
the European countries, the "European Construction" idea goes 
under the surface. 
THE ORIGIN OF MODERNITY 
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Modernity was created in a time, which had as main objectives, t 
or starting engines, teleology (Hellenic) and eschatology ()udeo- t 
Christian): it was always about walking towards the end, however, 
with a movement, perfectible and salvific. 
With the project, an aim was put forward. 
With the prospective, a look ahead was constructed. 
With progress, a movement towards was established. 
With t prediction, knowledge ahead was stated. 
The purpose was declared, a target was produced. 
With the program, what came ahead was set up. 
At last, with the promise, that can be considered an illocu-
tionary act guarantees about the future were possible, imagining it 
in a closing mode, because "there is something of immortal in a 
promise" (Jorge Luis Borges, em The Uneneding Gift, 1969). 
Teleology and eschatology led us to an idea of time, put to-
gether by the logos, that, as well as being a word, it is also a reason 
[and a reasonement]: project, prospective, progress, prediction, 
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purpose, program; and which gives us an idea of time, organized 
by the symbolic, which reunites in the promise what was once 
loose and scattered. 
The principle of hope expresses that same idea of time in 
its two main traditions, which created Europe, both in the secu-
lar tradition and in the religious tradition: we found this same 
exact principle clearly expressed in Ernst Block, in Das Prinzip 
Hoffnung (The Principle of Hope), a work that was created be-
tween 1937 and 1948, and in Jiirgen Moltmann, in the Theology 
of Hope, published in 1967 and inspired in Block. 
The principles of teleology and eschatology put together, 
determined the time which built modernity, turned us into the 
future, held back the present time (or kidnapped it and eclipsed 
it), assuming a mythical idea of a past, to which we would return 
in the end of times: a sort of come back to the Father's house, 
to the "sound of trumpets", as stated in Apocalypse according to 
Saint John, or to a society without classes, foreseen by Engels, in 
The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, or even 
to the idea before it decades from matter, as said by Plato in the 
VII Book of the Republic or in ''A Brave New World", which put 
together nature by itself, and made technology (specially bio-
technology and information technology) its underpinning. 
The coming together of the future and the past, to which 
we would return to in the end of times, history is wholesome and 
we represent just one, all of us, bent either by the progress, or by 
the promise. 
; 
As we are also able to promise (denying future possibili-
ties) and, therefore, upholding eternity, that our regime is, in-
deed, an analogy - we are like Gods, world creators. 
The present is a time of tensions, difficulties, conflicts, 
dualities, but also a time to make options, choices, to mislead 
and to hesitate. The mythical idea that the past, to where the 
. future's utopia is guided, withholds the present, captures it and 
turns it into an eclipse. 
The modern idea of time (teleological and eschatological) 
calmed us down, turning the present into a simple passage, a con-
trolled journey, as we make the terms for the departure from a 
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specific point - a final one (a ground point that makes sense, an 
unknown territory and stable identity) into the safe shore. And 
between its outset and the Apocalypse (a narrative of salvation}, 
the present assures us of an important passage to emancipation, 
freedom, civilization, God· s kingdom, society without classes, a 
better world. 
OUR ERA AND WHAT WE REPRESENT IN IT 
The technological \J.astening of the era and mobility completely 
destroyed the categories of traditional metaphysics - despite it 
shaping the conditions of possibility, functioning and circulation 
of our thought and knowledge. The speeding up of the period and 
technological enlistment united the close and the distant, the fu-
ture and the past, the real and the virtual, the thick and the light, 
the human and the non-human (bios and teckne joined together 
in post-human hybrid). By becoming the end in itself, and not just 
instrumental and anthropologic (Heidegger, i954), the technique 
was now devoted to human and speeded us up inestimably, mobi-
lizing us entirely into the global market. 
Nevertheless, in a "means without end" regime (Agamben, 
i995) and "suffering without purpose" (Lyotard, i993: 93), the 
overview is of the permanent history crisis and of the permanent 
human crisis (Martins, 2on). 
Ahead in the present, but without an assurance of a tele-
ological and eschatological passage, "with no rock, cape or pier''] 
(Sophia de Mello Breyner Andresen, i967}, we are left with the 
men in the own ambiguity of its division: rough, slimy, hesitant 
("Swollen Foot", like Oedipus, son of the earth, in the tragedy of 
Sophocles) and in a pathway, obliged to face its fears and to make 
uncertain choices about which way to follow. 
In post-colonial literature there is a growing of generalized 
understanding that the existence of united cultures, as opposed 
to mixed cultures. The Occidental cultures would be unite and 
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omission cultures, while post-colonial cnltures would be ofblend 
and of sharing. 
This thematic is accomplished, for example, by the Brazilian 
nation, taken into consideration, since Gilberto Freye (1933), as a 
mixed culture, of miscegenation, Brazil, a country ofhybrid culture, 
stated by Nestor Canclini (1995), a multicultural person, coming 
from a sharing and dialogicah background. The idea of a sharing 
and dialogical culture, originated from a multicultural country 
like Brazil, values different contributions - African, Amerinds, 
oriental and European - in the building of a national identity. 
All the same, the Western was built upon a united culture. It comes 
from the Greeks, by logos that is as much a word as it is purpose, and 
more importantly a supreme body of decision.As a matter of fact, 
the logos are uniqne and lone. Moreover, from another perspective, 
the Western also comes from the Jewish-Christian tradition, a word 
that has a symbolic purpose, a word that both unites and gathers. 
We all remember that in the Occidental symbolic, in the beginning 
there was the Verb and the Verb was turned towards God and the 
Verb was God, like it is uttered in the Prologue of St John's Gospel. 
Besides, to sum up, the great myth that lies in the Western 
is the word, the same as in the classic tradition, Greco-Roman, or 
in the Jewish-Christian tradition. And the word has always joined 
what was out of place and scattered. It constantly worked towards 
a bond, giving no importance to the fact that the word was logos, 
or a symbol. 
A thought about the unit opposed to the thought of multi-
plicity. The principle of identity, of Aristotle's logic, together with 
the Hegelian dialectics and its redemptive synthesis, and even the 
principle of the reunion that is the base of the symbolic figure, 
would rise against the diversity principle. Equally, a unity thought 
and logic of identity would be the foundation of the Western seg-
regation culture. 
The "".'estern culture, a logo centric, ethnocentric, imperialist and 
colonialist cnlture, which makes the difference, destroying it, has 
I For all Diana Pessoa de Barros (2012), Preconceito e Intolerd.ncia. 
15 
mixed with a multicultural culture, a multiple and participative 
culture, which has manifested in the appearance of a wide group 
of post-colonial countries created in a multitude oflanguages, in 
a blend of several ethnics and a boost of narratives. 
The traditional metaphysics was established by the word, 
a space to promise. And the promise denied a future by giving us 
pledges about it. It seems this same unity metaphysics has ended in 
the Western: we no longer get ahead by launching a purpose (towards 
the future), based on a lost foundation. Currently, we look forward 
to the present. Words, based on the future, have been replaced in 
the West by numbers, such as economical, financial, political and 
social crisis: mainly, the lack of growth or negative growth ofGl;>P· 
(Gross Domestic Product); the chronic shortage ofbalance between 
Exports and Imports in Trade Balance; the internal/external defi-
cit; the unemployment; the aging of the population; the spreading 
of the social inequalities; the drastic rupture of the demographic 
charts, the sinking numbers ofboth representation and legitimacy 
of democracy ... This is about numbers, which are facing present 
and which signalize Occidental crisis. Occidental life is no longer 
sort out by the priest, the men of the law and the politician, because 
the crisis is self imposed in the present, and there is a big bluer 
as regards seeing the horizon; now we have the economists, the 
engineers and the managers to make promises. They are our own 
magicians - present time magicians. 
Meanwhile, Information technologies, having its starting point 
in the Western, have created an economical and financial cosmopoli-
tan globalization, leaded by the global market, to where it assembles us 
totally and infinitively. The globalization of the market gave us a final 
identity, (1) for walkers, people which accept from now on a travelling 
precarious lifestyle, lacking social rights; (2) a group of people always 
ready to go, to any type ofjob,adaptingto the needs of the market; (3) 
a gathering of competitive individuals, with a sharp belief in the logic 
. of production; (4) and at least, by performance individuals, a group 
that successfully accomplish things. Furthermore, there is another 
unity culture; English language is the key to this world-culture. 
Established by the information and economic technologies, glo-
balization can't be disparate either by lonely individuals, or by 
16 
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nation-states in crisis. As a result, a cosmopolitan globalization 
· demands a multicultural globalization, which unites the people of 
geo-cultural ertlarged areas promotes and respects the differences, 
glorifying national languages. 
Multicultural globalization is accomplished by the mixture 
of, not ortly the ethnic miscegenation, but also by the miscegena-
tion of memories and traditions. So, we are able to say that, instead 
ofa poorly and one way homogenization, set up by the cosmopoli-
tan globalization, there is the multicultural globalization, which 
has as an advantage being heterogeneous; the seduction of a net 
of strings with several colors and textures, a web of various people 
and countries, able to resist to a decrease into an artificial unit. 
EUROPE IN THE CONTEXT 
OF TRANSNATIONAL IDENTITY 
Despite the culture being looked at as an imaginary symbolic produc-
tion, it is, nonetheless, important to persist in what the sociologist 
Pierre Bourdieu always believed to be crucial regarding the analysis of 
discursive questions. The symbolic systems are discursive phenom-
enon, a language issue, which has a social representation. Hence, a VŬŸĚ
cial logic is implicit to the social illustrations. Real definitions, or so-
cial divisions which are a big part in real division (Bordieu, 1980:65). 
As a symbolic expression, European identity shape constitutes 
ortly one category of words. It embodies a vast group of words, through 
which a relationship between the oneself and the other, between us 
and others, is staged. It is used to express belongin and identities, and 
even to border territories2 • 
The position where I stand from, the Bordieu's point of view, is 
defip.ed by a figure of European identity as a practical cataloging, 
2 Concerning collective representations, a Mxicon used to invoce and express belongings 
and social identitites, as well as barding territories, I have written, in 1996, Para uma 
Inversa ÔŠẂŤŦŠŸÙÙŬĦĚ
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or a division of the social world. Due to the fact that it is a realistic 
classification, a figure of European identity, conditional on practi-
cal functions and oriented to the production of social effects. As a 
matter of a fact, this is staged in a battle field, because it is, indeed, 
a battle, guided by a certain world symbolic order, or specific world 
guidance. This particular point of view is illustrated by an exam-
ple. The world definitions that serve as an example are the Euro-
pean multilingual communities and identities, which are in direct 
dispute with the Lusophone community and lusophony, British 
community and Commonwealth, Francophone community and 
Francophony, Hispanic community and Hispanic rival defini-
tions. In a post-colonial and globalised time, those same charac-
ters utter a fight for the symbolic world order. What is in play here 
is the division of the international community in cultural areas, 
shaping what Samuel Huntington (2001) calls the cultural war'. 
In the meantime, transcontinental societies, which have 
its project spread before the globalization became autonomous 
as a dominant variable, were fractionated into an secondary real-
ity: the European community converges the European countries, 
3 It is rather alannin9 that closely following the symbolic fi9ht, there is the polemology 
alert, which is taken over by the anned confrontation of several civilizations, branded by 
religious differences, in a specific circumstance in which all cultural areas have for the 
first time its own voice in the international scene and are forced to converge to globaliza-
tion, that is originated by scientifically, technical and market revolution. In a recent text, 
Adriano M_oreira (2004:4) reports the .same "alann methodology" as the one Samuel Hun-
tington specialized in. Facing "the worrying emergency or leap ahead of other cultures or 
ethnicities", the Huntin9ton awareness would have as a consequence "an or.ganization of a 
security policy that is more An9lo-Saxon than Western". 
Re9ardin9 politics and lan9ua9es oflusophone identity, a Colective Inquirity Project was 
launched, in 2004, by Centro de Estudos de ĿŬÜẀŪÙȘŠŸTŬĚe Sociedade da Universidade do 
Minho, called: "Lusocom: Estudo das Polfticas da Comunica¢o e dos Discursos sobre a 
Identidade Lus6fona", aftenvards, the collective work ĿŬÜẀŪÙȘŠŸTŬĚe Lusofonia (Martins, 
M., Sousa, H. i) Cabecinhas, R. (2006) was launched. Moreover, the ŃŤTŤŲŠŸTŬĚLus6fona 
de Ciencias da ĿŬÜẀŪÙȘŠŸŠŬĚreleased a Yearbook from which nine volumes were published 
http://www.lusocom.or9/pt/pa9/livrosf. In the meantime, since 2010, in that same Centro 
de Estudos, the project "Identity narratives and social memory: the (re)making oflusopho-
ny in intercultural contexts" http://www.lasics.uminho.pt/idnar/?lan9=en was carried on. 
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osely following the symbolic fight, there is the polemology 
ŸĚ armed confrontation of several civilizations, branded by 
fie circumstance in which all cultural areas have for the 
ternational scene and are forced to converge to globaliza-
tifically, technical and market revolution. In a recent text, 
ts the same "alarm methodology" as the one Samuel Hun-
he worrying emergency or leap ahead of other cultures or 
lreness would have as a consequence "an organization of a 
a-Saxon than Western". 
1es of lusophone identity, a Colective Inquirity Project was 
Estudos de Comunica¢o e Sociedade da Universidade do 
ŸŬĚdas Politicas da ĿŬÜẀŪÙȘŠŸŠŬĚe dos Discursos sabre a 
:ls, the collective work ĿŬÜẀŪÙȘŠŸŠŬĚe Lusofonia (Martins, 
(ioo6) was launched. Moreover, the Federa¢o Lus6fona 
eased a Yearbook from which nine volumes were published 
1/livros/. In the meantime, since 2010, in that same Centro 
narratives and social memory: the (re)makin9 oflusopho-
p://www.lasics.uminho.pt/idnar/?lan9-en was carried on. 
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Brazil and the Hispanic States come together as Mercosul; and 
francophone, the British lusophone community and Pan-Ara-
bism, develop different lines when of the African continent unit; 
for the time being, the Koran makes an appeal to the identity of a 
Muslim cord, that had its length from Gibraltar until Indonesia, 
and splits the world between North and South (Moreira, 2004:9). 
In these same circumstances, the task consists in harmonizing 
the multiple affiliations; on the one hand, based in the experi-
ence and history; on the other hand, encouraged by the readings 
of a great future; it is surely a mobilizing task for the govern-
ments, which have its power over a power crisis, but it is also a 
tempting investigation job (Ibidem). 
What is played throughout this symbolic fight between 
"cosmopolitan globalization and multicultural globalization" 
(Martins, 2011 a) is the power to define reality, as well as the power 
to impose, internationally, this same definition, or division. In 
that same understanding, the form of European identity is very 
different from social reality of the distinct national communities, 
where this symbolic battle takes place. And due to the fact that so-
cial representations of reality are not weird to the countries social 
reality that shapes it, which, in my opinion, must reevaluate the 
procedures that tend to deny to the European's identity, not just 
the symbolic efficiency, as also the political competence. 
This same understanding stops us from accepting the idea 
that here is nothing more that can be designated as a European 
culture and community. And as the European community hasn't 
got yet its own subject, since there is nothing that can be consid-
ered a common living mythology or an identity shared self-image. 
Or that there is nothing that can be interpreted as an effective 
value share, or ways to be in the world or how to be dealt with it. 
We need only think about the existing experience being 
lived in the migration camp by the European community, as well 
as in WUŸĚfield of its distinctive literatures. Supplied by their own 
language politics, both in the migration field, as in the distinct 
literature field, it constitutes the faultless revelation that culture 
and progress are the sons of mixture. Although there is little 
experience, we can also state that what makes this community 
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stronger and makes it have a louder voice is the union of cul-
turally solidarity countries, contributing this way to confirm its 
presence in the change of the international order. 
The horizontal cohesion, which comes from the giving 
out of the equivalent multi linguistic community and the mis-
cegenation of memories and traditions, one and the other iden-
tifying the European cultural area are what we think of as an 
ingredient that thickens the idea of "dependent globalization", 
giving thereby its contribution to "an articulation between a ter-
ritorial line of political powers and a worldwide civil society line 
by means ofa network (Moreira, 2004: 10). 
In what concerns the representation of the European 
community the idea that progress and culture have its origin in 
the ethnic miscegenation, as well as the memory, traditions and 
landscapes miscegenation. Additionally, the imposition of an 
idea that it is possible that a cultural federation with plenty of 
space to embrace several states may blossom inside a transna-
tional or supranational entity. 
However, in a time that makes the difference by globali-
zation, inter culture and multi culture, the European cultural 
space is nothing more than a plural and splintered space, with 
an equally plural and splintered memory. By this we defend that 
idea of belonging does not ignore the distinct multicultural na-
tional realities with diverse languages having a close relationship 
between them and, having often an internal close competition. 
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TWO FINAL NOTES 
Jfwe believe in the poet Paul Celan (1996:46), several accents fit 
our times: the acute in the present; the grave throughout history 
and the circumflex of eternity- the circumflex would signal expan-
sion. Though, it is my opinion that nowadays all our punctuation 
marks have been lost. History, the grave accent of time, the accent 
of our own responsibility for the state of the world and for our 
state, it is now a sort of disease, as Nietzsche (1874) diagnosed, dur-
ing its Second Intempestive Consideration. In the meantime, the 
present, the acute accent of tiine, has been constantly modified by 
the media in fait-divers, what is new is the "the new infecund sur-
face" (Benjamin, 1982:i73).And finally, everlasting, the circumflex 
accent, which expands time, is nothing but another fragment in 
a big flood that carries all the names in a constant plain presence 
(a ground): essence, substance, subject, conscience, existence, God, 
man, transcendental. .. (Derrida, 1967:410-411). 
Together with the missing accents comes the breakdown of 
the Occidental experience.Anyway, the possibilities of the human 
adventure fell drastically, since we have lost our sense of commu-
nity. In order to reinvent that horizon, a promise was carried out 
towards a path of perfection, of a shared community, that same 
notion of future awaits us. 
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